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Organizational  decision  making  is often  explored  with  theories  from  the  heuristics  and biases  research
program, which  have  demonstrated  great  value  as  descriptions of how  people  in  organizations  make
decisions. Nevertheless,  rational  analysis  and  classical  probability  theory are  still seen  by  many  as the
best accounts  of how  decisions  should be  made and  classical  probability  theory is the  preferred  frame-
work  for  cognitive  modeling  for  many  researchers.  The  focus  of this work is  quantum probability  theory,
an alternative  probabilistic  framework. Results  in decision making,  which appear  paradoxical from  a
perspective  of classical probability theory,  may  make  perfect sense  if  one  adopts  quantum probability
theory.  We review  some  cognitive  models of decision  making  based  on quantum probability  theory.  Each
of these  models is  based  on  a challenge  to  prescription  from  classical  probability  theory.  The transition
from  labeling a particular  behavior  as  irrational, by  classical probability  standards,  to (potentially)  ratio-
nal (or,  at  any rate,  not fallacious),  raises interesting  possibilities,  including that  of characterizing  certain
heuristics  in formal,  probabilistic  terms.
©  2014  Society for  Applied  Research  in  Memory and  Cognition.  Published by  Elsevier  Inc. This  is an
open  access article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In psychology, the classical rational model of decision making
assumes that decision makers comprehensively define a  problem,
understand all possible alternatives and their consequences, and
select the very best action after evaluating all the available options
(e.g., Anderson, 1991; March, 1997; Simon, 1979). Moreover, all
probabilistic computations are assumed to be carried out in  a  way
which conforms to the prescription from classical probability (CP)
theory. The link between rationality and CP theory can be justified
in important a  priori ways, such as the Dutch Book argument (e.g.,
Howson & Urbach, 1993), which shows that CP reasoning is  consis-
tent/coherent, in a  certain formal sense (Oaksford & Chater, 2009;
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, &  Goodman, 2011).
Yet many researchers have questioned the relevance of the clas-
sical rational model and CP theory in  modeling human decision
making, especially in the case of applied decision making situa-
tions (see also, e.g., Wakker, 2010,  for arguments relating to risk
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and loss aversion). The focus of the present article is organiza-
tional decision making. In such cases, decision makers are often
assumed to have limited cognitive resources and are faced with
environments which are uncertain, complex, and go beyond the
assumptions and manipulations of laboratory-based decision tasks.
As a  result, it has been argued that decision makers operate within
the limits of ‘bounded rationality’, frequently ‘satisficing’ by  making
good enough decisions (Simon, 1955) and adapting to their envi-
ronment by using heuristics and intuition, which can both enhance
(e.g., Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 1991; Klein, 1998) and
bias decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Kahneman,
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Moreover, working in  complicated, often
emotionally charged, organizational systems, decision makers have
to respond to  the needs of multiple stakeholders, who can politi-
cally influence the decision making process (e.g., Cyert & March,
1963; March & Simon, 1958; Pfeffer, 1981)  and both influence and
are influenced by the context and the situated, embodied aspects
of cognition, in which the decision is being made (e.g., Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Karuth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Weick, 1995;
Wheeler, 2005).
All these are considerations which undermine the descriptive
adequacy of CP theory decision making models and the rational
analysis approach, in  situations of applied decision making. Be that
as it may, for many researchers, rational analysis still provides the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.11.002
2211-3681/© 2014 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC  BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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prescription for how decision makers should reason, on the basis
of the available information. We  think this normative aspect of
prescription from CP models in  a  given situation is  particularly sig-
nificant, especially in the case of applied decision making, where,
clearly, there is an extra onus to  ensure that decisions are as ‘cor-
rect’ as possible. Relatedly, because of this point, it is  the case that
many researchers still find appealing cognitive modeling on the
basis of CP principles (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2009), despite the
evidence that, in many practical situations, modeling approaches
based on e.g., heuristics and biases may  have a higher descriptive
value (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 1991; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1996; Kahneman et al., 1982).
It is these points which motivate the approach in  the present
article, based on quantum probability (QP) theory. QP theory is  a
formal framework for how to  assign probabilities to  events, and
so it is possible to develop some normative arguments for QP the-
ory, analogous to those for CP theory (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2014).
Equally, some processes in QP theory appear to have natural inter-
pretations in terms of existing, well-known heuristics, such as
the representativeness or availability heuristics (cf. Busemeyer &
Bruza, 2012; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013). It  is  then possible that
QP theory can provide a perspective on organizational decision
making, which is close to  descriptive assumptions from relevant
heuristics and biases and, equally, consistent with the general, a
priori arguments, which motivate CP accounts and corresponding
normative considerations. Our specific objective is  to  provide some
preliminary discussion of whether such an exciting (though, also,
ambitious) objective might be  achievable or not.
Many of the decision making phenomena that have been stud-
ied as part of the QP research program concern situations for
which the normative (from CP theory) prescription goes against a
very strong intuition for an alternative decision. Intuition has been
defined as “affectively-charged judgments that arise through rapid,
non-conscious, and holistic associations” (Dane & Pratt, 2007:
40). Intuition is seen as important in the use of heuristics (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Klein, 1998, 2003), produces decisions
that can at times appear irrational, at least without detailed anal-
ysis (e.g., Klein, 1998), and as a  process is  itself difficult to explain
rationally (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Both CP  theory and QP theory are, in
part, intended as theories for how intuitions regarding the relative
likelihood of different possibilities develop. While the work just
cited indicates a  divergence between predictions from CP models
and current understanding about intuition, a consideration of QP
theory can lead to  alternative conclusions.
QP theory was devised to explain paradoxical findings in quan-
tum physics that could not be  understood using classical theories. It
is based on axioms fundamentally different from those of CP theory
and so corresponding probabilistic inference involves character-
istics (such as superposition, incompatibility, and entanglement),
with  no analogs in  classical theory. It has helped physicists under-
stand, for example, how different events within a  system interfere
with one another and how the measurement of a  system influences
the state of the system. Such phenomena are also observed in deci-
sion making research, for example, in relation to order effects (e.g.,
Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992)  and the constructive role that making a
choice can have on underlying preferences (e.g., Payne, Bettman, &
Johnson, 1993; Sharot, Velasquez, & Dolan, 2010). So, proponents
of the application of QP theory in cognition have argued that these
special characteristics of QP align well with human decision mak-
ing under uncertainty, at least under some circumstances. In fact,
human decision making behavior, which may  appear paradoxical
or irrational from a  classical perspective, often has a  simple and nat-
ural explanation in terms of QP principles. Of relevance is also the
fact that, in QP theory, the incompatibility of certain possibilities
means that their probabilistic computation needs to  be sequential,
so that, for example, even conjunctions need to  be assessed in  a
sequential way. Such requirements make QP theory computation
closer to  process assumptions and so, perhaps, more suitable for
modeling the situations of applied decision making that  we are
interested in. In general, it has been suggested that incorporat-
ing  process assumptions into cognitive models is an appropriate
direction for their development (Jones &  Love, 2011; cf. Newell,
1990).
The structure of our contribution in this Special Issue is as
follows: first, we will briefly summarize QP theory and consider
the motivation for exploring its application in cognitive model-
ing. It is not our intention to provide a  comprehensive overview
of QP theory research, for reviews see, for example, Busemeyer and
Bruza (2012), Khrennikov (2010),  Pothos and Busemeyer (2013)
and Wang, Busemeyer, Atmanspacher, and Pothos (2013).  Second,
we will consider some of the key insights about human deci-
sion making, from existing QP cognitive models, as developed in
the context of particular empirical applications (mostly based on
Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Pothos &  Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood
& Busemeyer, 2011; Wang &  Busemeyer, 2013). The selection
of empirical applications will be motivated from corresponding
conclusions that human behavior deviates from the prescription
of CP theory. Of course, there are often typically powerful non-
CP theory accounts for such findings (e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten,
2001; Marewski & Schooler, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
The emphasis on CP theory relates to the emphasis on normative
considerations in this paper. As  discussed, we think that  this is  a
valuable approach, especially in  situations of applied significance,
where decision makers may  be particularly keen to achieve deci-
sions considered ‘correct’ in some formal sense (since deviations
from normative prescription may lead to e.g., material loss). For
each of these insights/applications, we discuss the new perspec-
tive  that QP provides on organizational decision making and the
possible implications and benefits. That is,  our discussion will be
more focused on the normative perspective (conflicts with CP the-
ory and corresponding QP theory insights), less so by the descriptive
or  bounded rationality perspective, provided by models based on
heuristics and biases (though, obviously, both perspectives are
valuable).
Inevitably, some of the recommendations in this paper, in rela-
tion to QP theory, will involve speculation. Our work so far has
focused on establishing the formal validity of QP  cognitive mod-
els, against empirical results of high prominence in the decision
making literature. There has been little systematic investigation
or empirical research into the applicability of QP models in  orga-
nizational settings (for exceptions see the work of Lawless and his
colleagues discussing how  principles of QP can be applied to model-
ing social dynamics, such as cooperation and competition, in  teams
and organizations; Lawless & Sofge, 2012; Lawless & Grayson, 2003;
Lawless, Bergman, Louc¸ ã,  Kriegel, & Feltovich, 2007; Lawless et al.,
2011; see also Yukalov &  Sornette, 2012, who  apply their quan-
tum decision theory (Yukalov & Sornette, 2008), a  theory developed
for individual personal decision making, to decision makers under
the influence of other social agents). We  hope that this paper can
serve to inspire further work toward an applied direction for the QP
cognition program, in relation to organizational decision making.
The ideas we outline below provide an alternative perspective for
rationality and optimality in  probabilistic inference and motivate
a discussion of implications (and possible aids) in organizational
decision making.
2. An outline of quantum probability theory
QP theory is  a  theory for how to  assign probabilities to events. It
is  best known in  its application to  physics, in the context of quan-
tum mechanics. But, the rules regarding probabilistic assignment
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in quantum mechanics (what we call QP theory) have no essential
physical content and can,  in  principle, be  applied in  any situation,
where there is a  need to formalize uncertainty. Well known applica-
tions of quantum theory outside physics are  in information theory
(e.g., Nielsen & Chuang, 2010) and information retrieval (e.g., Van
Rijsbergen, 2004; Widdows, 2004).
The application of QP theory in  psychology has been gain-
ing momentum in recent years and spans a range of cognitive
research themes, such as conceptual combination (e.g., Aerts, 2009;
Aerts & Gabora, 2005), similarity (Pothos, Busemeyer, & Trueblood,
2013), memory (e.g., Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009), and
perception (Atmanspacher & Filk, 2010). In  decision making the-
ory, note that, within the QP theory community, a  number of
different modeling approaches have been adopted (e.g., Aerts &
Aerts, 1995; Basieva & Khrennikov, 2014; Bordley & Kadane, 1999;
Bordley, 1998; Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011;
Khrennikov & Haven, 2009; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir, & Zwirn,
2009; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009; Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011;
Wang & Busemeyer, 2013; Yukalov & Sornette, 2008, 2009). We  do
not review these approaches in detail (for overviews organized in
single volumes see Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Khrennikov, 2010,
and the special issue of Topics in  Cognitive Science, Wang et al.,
2013). Instead, we focus on examples of models which we think
provide simple illustrations of the main principles underlying QP
cognitive accounts of decision making generally and the implica-
tions these have for organizational decision making.
The use of QP theory in psychology has enabled the introduction
of several novel theoretical concepts. One new concept is  that, in
QP theory, certain questions are considered incompatible, mean-
ing that certainty for one requires (ontic) uncertainty for the other.
The idea of incompatibility is  related to the existence of uncertainty
relations; that is, the requirement that the combined uncertainty
for particular pairs of questions can never be reduced below a  min-
imum level. Another new concept is  that a person’s knowledge can
be characterized as a  superposition state, with respect to  particular
questions, which means that precise values for the corresponding
questions do not exist, until a measurement is  made. Finally, in
QP theory cognitive states can be entangled, so that corresponding
measurements may  result in  super-correlations, not possible in  CP
theory.
A lot of the strangeness of QP theory arises because events are
represented as subspaces in a  multidimensional vector space, called
a Hilbert space.1 By contrast, events in CP theory are subsets of a
sample space. Greatly oversimplifying, the difference between QP
and CP theory is one between a  geometric representation of prob-
abilities vs. a set-theoretic representation one. The implication of
this difference is that the structure of events in CP  theory is  that of a
Boolean algebra, but in QP theory it is only a partial Boolean algebra,
meaning that, in the latter, operations like conjunction or  disjunc-
tion are not defined for all possible pairs of possibilities (Hughes,
1989).
We  aim to present our examples below, as much as possible,
with little mathematical detail. So, we here discuss only the very
basic aspects of how probabilities are assigned to events in  QP the-
ory (e.g., Isham, 1989). Consider the mental state of a participant,
e.g., when contemplating which of two options to choose. This
mental state is  represented as a  vector in a Hilbert space. Then, dif-
ferent events or choices for the relevant situation are represented
as subspaces in the Hilbert space. Such subspaces can have any
dimensionality. A fundamental assumption in  QP theory is  that the
probability that the state is  consistent with a particular event is the
squared length of the projection onto the corresponding subspace.
1 Hilbert spaces are vector spaces defined on  a complex field endowed with an
inner product, and having certain convergence properties as well.
Note, this means that  mutually exclusive events have to  be  at right
angles with each other. Incompatible events are represented as
subspaces at oblique angles, relative to each other, such that the
smaller the angle, the higher the classical correlation between
these possibilities. Finally, if a  person observes that an event is  true,
then a  new cognitive state is  formed by projecting the current state
onto the subspace of the observed event. This is the “infamous”
state reduction or “collapse” that occurs in quantum theory. We
do not wish to discuss the mathematics of QP theory any further at
this point, but rather flesh out some of the underlying principles,
as this becomes relevant in the examples below.
3. Strategic decision making and incompatibility
Strategic decisions are characterized as being novel, ambigu-
ous, complex, open-ended (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret,
1976), and influenced by a  diverse range of interacting social, emo-
tional and political factors (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki, 1992; March &  Simon, 1958;Pfeffer, 1981; Tetlock, 1985).
For example, if a  decision maker is required to  look at which new
production technology they should invest in, he or she will need
to consider objective information about the competing systems,
alongside the different views held by stakeholders about the cost
of the investment, the quality of the new technology and the time it
will take to get production up  and running. These various consider-
ations represent distinct rationales which, depending on the power
and social influence of the stakeholders, can diverge or  overlap (e.g.,
Janis, 1972; Langley, 1995). This type of loosely structured context
is said to foster the use of intuition in decision making (e.g., Klein,
1998; Shapiro & Spence, 1997). During the course of the decision
making process, the various inputs may  interact with one another,
so that, for example, if the decision maker is  certain that quality is an
important factor, then perhaps their feelings about the importance
of cost or  time to production become less certain.
From a  cognitive modeling point of view, the idea that  the inter-
action of different cognitive events (e.g., a thought or a  feeling)
might influence a  decision maker’s intuition and final judgment is
quite plausible and can be  illustrated by the conjunction fallacy,
one of the most famous phenomena studied in  the heuristics-
and-biases program. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) presented to
participants a  short vignette about a  hypothetical person, Linda,
who was described very much as a feminist, but not a bank teller.
Then, participants were asked to rank order a set of statements
about Linda. The critical statements were (1) that  Linda is a bank
teller (BT) and (2) that Linda is a bank teller and a  feminist (BT & F).
Participants ranked the latter as more probable than the former,
hence indicating that they considered Prob(BT&F) > Prob(BT), a
result that is called the conjunction fallacy. Since Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1983) seminal study, the conjunction fallacy has been
frequently replicated with many other kinds of stimuli and exper-
imental situations (though see e.g., Hertwig &  Gigerenzer, 1999).
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) argued that the conjunction fal-
lacy arises because Linda is  very similar to  the typical feminist, so
that she is likely to be considered a  probable bank teller and a femi-
nist. It  was suggested that this representativeness heuristic is what
guides decision making and that, indeed, CP theory has nothing to
do  with cognition (at least in such cases). The conjunction fallacy is
very hard to reconcile with a CP prescription, because CP theory is
based on set theory and a  single sample space for all events; a more
specific event can never be more probable than an inclusive, more
general one. Put differently, the hypothetical Lindas who  are both F
and BT  can never be more numerous than the ones who are  just BT.
There have been, of course, explanations of the conjunction fallacy
based on, e.g., heuristics (including Tversky & Kahneman’s, 1983,
one). However, as discussed, our emphasis here is the perspective
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from formal probability theory. If CP theory is considered a  norma-
tive standard, and decision makers commit the conjunction fallacy,
does that mean that it is incorrect to  use a  heuristic in this situation
and instead is it more desirable to pursue correctives? The applica-
tion of QP theory in the problem can help inform this key question.
The relationship between variables in  decision making and the
sequence in which they are considered, lies at the heart of incom-
patibility, one of the key concepts of QP. Bohr (1928), an early
pioneer of quantum theory, introduced the concept. Interestingly,
there is some evidence that Bohr may  have been influenced by the
work of James (1890a,b),  who had considered these issues from
a psychological perspective (Holton, 1970). In quantum theory,
two observables or measurements which are  non-commuting (e.g.,
position and momentum) are said to  be incompatible. When mea-
surements are incompatible they are subject to order effects so that
measuring in one order may  produce results different to measur-
ing in a different order, AB /=  BA. This is different from classical
observables, which have to obey the law of commutativity in  con-
junctions (e.g., AB = BA). As observables in quantum theory are both
properties of and operations on the state of the system, they can
also be considered actions (Wang et al., 2013). This means that the
effect of a given action sequence on an initial state will depend on
the order in which those actions occur.
Busemeyer et al. (2011) have shown how a  QP model can provide
a natural account for the conjunction fallacy. The key assumption
was that the possibilities that Linda is  an F and, separately, a  BT,
are incompatible, so that they cannot be assessed concurrently.
Therefore, the conjunction BT&F does not exist and, instead, one
needs to evaluate the sequential conjunction BT& then F or F &
then BT (Busemeyer et al., 2011,  argued that the latter is more cog-
nitively plausible). How does the QP model work? For  incompatible
questions, establishing the answer for one changes the perception
for answering the other. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment can
be strongly order and context dependent. Thus, for example, from
the perspective of the initial story about Linda, she  is  extremely
unlikely to be a BT. But, once participants have accepted the F
property for Linda, then it is  easier to recognize that feminists can
have all sorts of professions. From this feminist perspective, it is
easier to accept the possibility that Linda might be a BT (in both
cases, ‘easier’ is relative to how easy it is to accept the possibility
that Linda might be a  BT, from the baseline perspective of just the
story).
Translating this example into an applied context, strategic
decisions that concern significant organizational change might
illustrate how ‘committing’ the conjunction fallacy can make sense.
In such situations, decision makers can be emotionally attached to
existing strategies (e.g., Finkelstein, Whitehead & Campbell, 2008)
and it is argued that, in order to change, decision makers need to
loosen their emotional commitment (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Resis-
tance to change can be  a product of the perceived threat that the
changes pose to social identities (e.g., Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000;
Haslam, Eggins, & Reynolds, 2003; Hogg &  Terry, 2000). The ability
of an organization to  manage how its employees affectively react
to organizational changes that impact on their social identity (e.g.,
Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011) and respond to the collective emo-
tions of the organization (e.g., Huy, 1999, 2002)  can be critical in
the success of change initiatives. Having people make decisions that
run  contrary to their existing perceptions of their organization is
difficult; large changes in identity are perceived as unattainable
and small changes are perceived as irrelevant (Reger, Gustafon,
Demarie, & Mullane 1994). One way through this is by exploiting
the principles of QP, as demonstrated in the explanation of the con-
junction fallacy, that the conjunction of two events can increase
the probability of making a  decision in a  given direction, because
accepting a more probable event can facilitate the acceptance of
a less probable one (assuming the two events are linked, in some
way).
Consider a  new CEO of a  manufacturing company. Strategically,
she thinks that she needs to change the positioning of the company,
to  being more technologically advanced. Doing so will both increase
the efficiency of production and also convey the right image of
the organization to customers and shareholders that is needed to
succeed in  the future. The board needs to decide in favor of this
change in strategic direction, but, historically, investment in  new
technology has not been a  priority for this company and so the
probability of them deciding to  pursue it is low. Are there any con-
ditions under which the board might decide to  support the CEO’s
favored strategy?
Consider next an alternative approach the CEO could adopt. She
suggests that strategically the organization needs to re-position
itself as a  more environmentally friendly firm, at the forefront
of ensuring high environmental standards, which are increasingly
favored by customers and subject to government guidelines and
regulations. This argument might be easier to make, as it resonates
with the importance of maintaining a  revenue stream. Having made
this argument and convinced the board, it might then become
easier to persuade them to  invest in new technology to improve
efficiency, thereby making their production processes more envi-
ronmentally friendly. Depending on the information presented
and, critically, the sequence in  which it is  presented, the prob-
ability of the board selecting the CEO’s preferred approach may
be increased, in a way  analogous to  how the conjunction fallacy
emerges. In other words, this is a case whereby the probabil-
ity of a single change (being technologically advanced) is  lower
than the probability of a (quantum) conjunction (being environ-
mentally friendly and then being technologically advanced; note,
the quantum model predictions regarding the emergence of  the
conjunction fallacy are order-dependent, in relation to the consid-
eration of the premises; Busemeyer et al., 2011). Having accepted
the change in relation to being environmentally friendly, it becomes
more plausible to accept the further change of being technolog-
ically advanced – the first change has a facilitatory effect on the
second one, because the two share a  causal connection. For  this
to be the case, the two changes have to  be ‘incompatible’ (in
the quantum sense) and, moreover, one change (which we can
call the facilitatory change) has to make the target change one
more plausible. Finally, clearly, facilitation can occur only if the
changes are carried out in a  certain order, from facilitatory to  tar-
get.
This example from organizational decision making demon-
strates how an explanation in formal terms can be provided by
QP theory for a  decision which, so far, could only be explained in
heuristic terms. Of course, there are  alternative explanations, for
why, in the above example, the probability of the board accept-
ing the proposal is  influenced by the conjunction of those two
particular options. For example, resistance may  be  diminished by
linking one aspect of the change that does accord with peoples’
social identity (being environmental friendly) with another aspect
that does not (being technologically advanced). This and other
perspectives can help elaborate the relevant cognitive processes.
But, the conjunction fallacy has been labeled a  fallacy because
it does not  make sense in  terms of a normative perspective on
decision making, based on CP theory. But, it is  fully consistent
with QP theory, an alternative formal probabilistic framework,
which raises the question of whether the conjunction fallacy should
really be  considered a  fallacy at all. The application of QP  the-
ory so helps elucidate the key question of normative guidance
that we are interested in and it also demonstrates how the novel
theoretical concepts in QP theory (in this case incompatibility)
can help increase our understanding of human decision mak-
ing.
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4. Uncertainty, organizational change and violations of  the
law of total probability
Organizational inertia, the tendency of businesses, especially
those at the maturity phase of the lifecycle, to continue operat-
ing in the same way,  is  an issue facing many organizations as they
make decisions about strategy. Inertia typically precedes decline for
many businesses, especially incumbent businesses facing the entry
of new players in  their markets, unless attempts are made to  over-
come their rigidity (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Tushman
& Anderson, 1986). Such businesses demonstrate an apathy and
reluctance toward change, preferring to stick with their established
approaches (Miller & Friesen, 1980; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985)
and defending previous decisions, in spite of evidence that demon-
strates their failure (Staw, 1976; Staw & Ross, 1987). The difficulty
of organizational change in this situation is often due to the strength
of emotional attachment to previous strategies and the threat that
the changes pose to self-esteem (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
Finkelstein et al., 2008; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011; Teece et al.,
1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). As  Lewin (1951) argued, if peo-
ple are happy with the status quo, regardless of what internal or
external triggers for organizational change exist, there is no impe-
tus for them to  change.
From the perspective of modeling cognitive processes in
decision making, this situation reflects what we will call the
‘total probability trap’. The law  of total probability is  a funda-
mental principle in  the mathematical structure of CP theory
and is illustrated by the sure-thing principle described by Savage
(1954). Savage demonstrated his  principle using as an exam-
ple, a familiar scenario in  organizational decision making, a
deliberation regarding a  strategic investment. A business exec-
utive is contemplating investing in a  property and he believes
the outcome of the next  American presidential election to  be
critical to the decision. After asking whether he  would invest
if a Democrat or Republican won the election and concluding
that he would invest regardless of who  won, the executive con-
cludes that he should invest, even though he  is  uncertain about the
outcome of the election. Note, according to the sure thing principle,
Prob(invest) = Prob(invest|republicn)·Prob(republican) +  Prob(invest|
democrate)·Prob(democrate), so that Prob(invest) is  bound by
Prob(invest|republican) and Prob(invest|democrate). So, if the agent
thinks he should be behaving rationally (a reasonable assump-
tion!), then he  may  feel compelled to invest in the unknown
case, in a way  consistent with the law of total probability. This
requirement clearly constrains possible behavior, but, as the
following example shows, people’s decision making is  not  always
constrained by the law of total probability.
Shafir and Tversky (1992) provided an ingenious test of whether
human decision making is consistent with the law of total proba-
bility. They had participants play a  prisoner’s dilemma game. As is
standard in such games, there were two possible actions, defect (D)
and cooperate (C) and two players, which, in Shafir and Tversky’s
experiment were the participant in  the experiment and a  hypo-
thetical opponent. The combination of the action of the participant
and the hypothetical opponent determined the payoff to  both. The
payoffs were set up in  such a  way, that  no matter what the hypo-
thetical opponent did, it was advantageous for the participant to
D. Shafir and Tversky’s (1992) experiment involved some so-called
bonus trials, in which the participant was told of the opponent’s
action. Predictably enough, when a  typical participant was told that
the  opponent chose to D, she would D  as well; likewise, when she
was told the opponent chose to C, by far the most common action
was to D. The surprising finding was that, when the opponent’s
action was unknown, many participants reversed their action and
chose to C. Thus, Shafir and Tversky (1992) showed that Prob(D,
unknown) /= Prob(D∧known D)  +  Prob(D∧known C), so violating the
law  of total probability. Since this pioneering study, several other
analogous results have been reported (e.g., Busemeyer, Wang, &
Mogiliansky-Lambert, 2009; Croson, 1999).
The intuition about the psychological process in  Shafir and
Tversky’s (1992) experiment is that there are perhaps good reasons
for defecting under each of the ‘known’ conditions. For example,
when a participant knows the opponent cooperates, it makes sense
to choose to D, so as to  make more money. When a  participant
knows the opponent defects, a D  action makes sense, as retribution.
But, these two  reasons to D  fail to come to mind in the unknown
condition. It  is as if, when there is uncertainty, these individually
good reasons to  D interfere with each other, that is, cancel each
other out.
Regarding Shafir and Tversky’s (1992) experimental situation,
the classical prescription is straightforward. If you do action A,
given X and you do  action A, given ∼X, then you should do  action
A, regardless of whether you know about X or not. Pothos and
Busemeyer (2009) showed how  a  quantum model for Shafir and
Tversky’s (1992) experimental situation reproduces the observed
violations of the law of total probability (related applications are
in  Trueblood & Busemeyer, 2011; Wang & Busemeyer, 2013).  What
this means is  that, although according to  CP  theory it is wrong to
violate the law of total probability, according to QP theory, given
that a person chooses action A, given X and, separately, given ∼X,
then it can be correct (in the sense of probabilistic prescription
from QP theory) to reverse his/her decision and do  ∼A, in a  situa-
tion where there is uncertainty about X. Note, it is  not the case that
a  person should reverse action in  the situation of unknown informa-
tion, rather that, according to QP theory (and contrary to CP  theory),
consistency of action with the individual known conditions is  not
required.
So as with our discussion of the conjunction fallacy, we  ask are
there situations in  organizational decision making where breaking
the law of total probability might make sense? Take, for example,
a  large, mature organization which has a  newly hired, enthusiastic
marketing manager, who thinks that there is  a  need to  re-energize
and promote a brand with a new marketing campaign in order to
increase sales revenue. A new campaign carries risk, until it has
been tried and tested. Why  should decision makers sanction a  trial?
If our marketing manager argues that the existing marketing cam-
paign (A) does not generate the level of sales that the product should
be achieving (∼X), decision makers in  an organization suffering
from inertia may  still reject the marketing manager’s proposal. For
example, they may  be emotionally committed to  the existing cam-
paign, they may  feel that they have made a significant investment,
and, finally, that the current approach is  at least generating some
revenue. Thus, they may  elect to  continue with the existing cam-
paign (A). If the existing campaign (A) is  generating an acceptable
level of sales (X), then they will elect to continue anyway. Psycho-
logically they may  be suffering from the sunk cost fallacy (Arkes &
Blumer, 1985)  and may  also fear reputational risk  to themselves, if
the new campaign fails. And of course there may also be other social,
emotional and political forces at work (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011;
Teece et al., 1997; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) that are helping to
maintain the status quo. At this point, with this example, all we
have done is point out that an undesirable action, A, is likely to be
adopted under both circumstances X and circumstances ∼X.  Clas-
sically, by the law of total probability, the normative prescription
requires us to adopt A, even when knowledge about X is  lacking.
Some heuristic approaches, such as the failure of  consequen-
tial reasoning principle in  Shafir and Tversky’s (1992) research,
provide a  descriptive account of violations of the law of total prob-
ability. However, such accounts do not  allow us to overturn the
interpretation of fallaciousness, which is  the classically required
characterization of violations of the law of total probability. We
have argued that this is  important, especially in  situations in  which
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there is a requirement for decision making to conform to a nor-
mative standard, that  is, in situations in which reasoning has to be
considered correct. But, if QP theory can be applied in the situa-
tion of interest, then decision makers can, correctly, reverse their
action, when there is  uncertainty about the critical information.
The QP theory formulation resonates with Lewin’s (1951) classic 3
step metaphor for change. The first step, unfreezing, involves the
reduction of forces that are  maintaining stability and introducing
more uncertainty so that changes can be made.
In the case of our marketing manager, this means that he should
not refer to the revenues associated with the existing campaign
and whether or not they are acceptable. He might discuss alterna-
tive reasons, but, he should maintain uncertainty about the critical
information. With an absence of the contextual information that  is
responsible for making people reach identical decisions, this allows
for the possibility that reverse decisions will be made and a  viola-
tion of the law of  total probability. Note that, the standard intuition
is that decisions should be made on  the basis of availability of
all necessary information; uncertainty generated by an absence of
information would not  be considered optimal or  desirable. This is
not to say that people can manage uncertainty in an optimal way.
Indeed, people are generally uncertainty averse (Ellsberg, 1961;
Epstein, 1999; Fox & Tversky, 1995) and uncertainty is  regarded as
an aversive state that people are motivated to reduce (e.g., Hirsch,
Mar, & Peterson, 2012; Hogg, 2000; Weary & Edwards, 1996).
With the above thoughts in  mind, one way to understand the
QP formulation in more psychological terms is  that perhaps con-
textual information anchors or forces the decision making process
into inevitable directions. However, feelings of uncertainty have
been shown to prolong positive moods and stimulate curiosity
(Bar-Anan, Wilson, &  Gilbert, 2009; Kurtz, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2007;
Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005). The absence of infor-
mation, then, allows for additional perspectives in  decision making
and flexibility in thinking.
5. Organizational decision making and order effects
The complexity of real-life, organizational decisions means that
decision makers frequently have to  consider various pieces of infor-
mation processed in a  particular sequence. Different factors, such
as social influence, politics or organizational procedures may  deter-
mine the sequencing of information in the decision making process.
For example, organizations often have to  make decisions about
their personnel as part of their selection and performance appraisal
procedures. These types of decisions have been shown to be  sus-
ceptible to the effects of interference between different variables in
the decision making process (Highhouse, 1996, 2008; Thorsteinson,
Breier, Atwell, Hamilton, & Privette, 2008). In assessment centers,
which represent a  common way of selecting new employees, con-
trast effects have been demonstrated, when there is a  difference in
performance levels between candidates, such that one candidate’s
performance can be rated as poor or strong depending on the per-
formance of other candidates in  the same exercise, even when the
target candidate’s performance is no different in  either situation
(e.g., Gaugler & Rudolph, 1992). Similarly, in performance appraisal,
the procedures by which organizations evaluate employees can
be subject to order effects generated by  contrasting variations in
performance between different employees (e.g., Palmer, Maurer, &
Feldman, 2002).
The cognitive processes underlying such decision making can
be viewed as heuristic processes taking place under conditions of
uncertainty (Reb, Greguras, Luan, & Daniels, 2014). In particular, the
order in which information is  processed and decisions are made can
influence the outcome. A study by Moore (2002),  using Gallup polls,
provides a good illustration of these ideas. Moore (2002) considered
the same two questions, asked in  two different orders, within a
Gallup poll. For example, participants were asked the questions
“Do you generally think Bill Clinton is honest and trustworthy?”
and “Do  you generally think Al Gore is  honest and trustworthy”
in either of two orders. When the Clinton question was first, 50%
answered yes, when second 57%. When the Gore question was first
and second, the corresponding percentages were 68% and 60%. The
results partly suggest a  process of assimilation, whereby the second
question produces an answer which indicates a  degree of consis-
tency with the first (Moore, 2002). Psychologically, such results are
intuitive. When a  question is asked first, the person must rely on
knowledge she  can retrieve from memory related to  the question.
But, if this question is  preceded by another one, then the person
will incorporate some of her thoughts retrieved from the previous
question into her answer for the second one (e.g., Schwarz, 2007).
According to CP  theory, such order effects are fallacious. Con-
sider two  events, saying ‘yes’ to the Clinton question (Clinton)
and saying ‘yes’ to the Gore question (Gore). Then, the classical
description of the situation is  that the probability of saying yes
to Clinton and yes to Gore is  the probability of saying yes to
Clinton, followed by the probability of saying yes to Gore, given the
Clinton answer. In other words, we have Prob(Gore|Clinton)·Prob
(Clinton) = Prob(Gore&Clinton) =  Prob(Clinton|Gore)·Prob(Gore).
So, classically, it is an error if, across a  sample of observers, the
answers to  the Clinton, Gore questions produce different probabil-
ities (a classical model can be augmented with order parameters
to  numerically accommodate such results, but then the modeling
framework becomes merely descriptive).
A  QP model for question order effects (e.g., Wang & Busemeyer,
2013; for a  simplified exposition see Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013)
would assume that the possibilities that Clinton is honest and
Gore is  honest are incompatible, but also correlated with each
other. Then, the answer to  the two  questions is a  quantum con-
junction, so that, depending on order, we would have either
Prob(Clinton &then Gore) or Prob(Gore &then Clinton). Let us con-
sider the second order. It  is  assumed that evaluating the Clinton
question in isolation requires that Clinton is  not considered par-
ticularly honest. However, having accepted Gore as honest creates
an alternative perspective, from which Clinton appears more hon-
est (because of the relation between the two  candidates). It is  as
if the higher honesty of Gore somewhat transfers to a judgment
about Clinton as well. This transfer is possible because Gore and
Clinton would, in general, be perceived fairly similar, since they
ran together.
Applying these QP ideas to the situation of personnel decision
making suggests that, if you are evaluating the performance of  Al
and Bill, the rating for each might depend on whom you evaluate
first. If you first consider Al, you are likely to incorporate some of  the
thoughts retrieved about Al into your evaluation of Bill. According
to the QP model for order effects, such influences are likely to  be
generated, when there is some kind of connection between Al and
Bill, for example, perhaps they work on the same team or  on similar
tasks. Note that, when a  decision simply involves the rank ordering
of two  related options, then such order effects could be less of  an
issue. If you had to choose between just Al  Gore and Bill Clinton
based on how trustworthy you felt they were (cf.  Moore, 2002),
then whichever order you considered, Al Gore would have been
selected. But, suppose additional options are included in the choice
set, for example Lionel Messi, a candidate unrelated to Al  Gore or Bill
Clinton, who  is therefore unlikely to influence the ratings of  the two
original candidates. Then, the actual rating of trustworthiness for
each option does matter and so order effects could lead to  inferior
decision making, in that a factor irrelevant to  the objective quality
of the candidates (here, their order of evaluation) might affect the
choice. For  example, suppose that Messi is evaluated at 65%, Gore
at 60%, when he is  evaluated first, and at 68% when he is evaluated
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second. Clearly, whether Gore receives the top rating now depends
on his assessment order, relative to Clinton.
No research, to the best of our knowledge, applying QP ideas
to personnel evaluation has been carried out, although there are
a number of empirical studies that suggest that QP might be a
fruitful avenue for modeling the cognitive processes underlying
performance appraisal. Order effects in  evaluation are an obvious
direction for further work, but  there are other promising direc-
tions as well. For example, in research on the decision making of
selection, the so-called decoy effect involves the introduction of a
third option, which is  dominated by only one of an existing pair of
equal options. This can lead to decision makers favoring the dom-
inating option (e.g., Highhouse, 1996; Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982;
Slaughter, Bagger, &  Li,  2006), suggesting interference effects such
as those typical of QP models. Dilution effects, whereby new, appar-
ently irrelevant information, produces less extreme judgments
(Nisbett, Zukier, &  Lemley, 1981), may  also influence performance
appraisal (e.g., Reb et al., 2014)  and be a  good avenue of exploration
with QP modeling. Furthermore, these types of effects are obviously
not restricted to personnel decision making, but can equally be
applied to other types of organizational decisions, such as the eval-
uation of different marketing campaigns for the same product or
in strategic decision making when considering, for example, two
separate, but related, markets (e.g., Korea and Taiwan). Our main
point is that, typically, QP based models can plausibly accommo-
date effects, such as the ones described above and so offer insight
into the underlying cognitive processes. For example, in  the case
of question order effects, the context created by  the first judgment
or piece of information that is  processed alters the cognitive state
and so interferes with the subsequent judgment; the advantage of
using a QP model is that it allows a  more detailed specification of
the underlying representations and processes.
6. Intuition, superposition and the constructive nature of
human judgment
It has been argued that whilst intuition can be fostered
through experience, the development of expertise, and complex,
domain relevant schemas, intuitive judgments themselves cannot
be forced. Instead they happen instantaneously and involuntarily
as a response to internal or external stimuli (Dane & Pratt, 2007;
Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008). Given that intu-
ition is, by its very nature, hard to explain rationally (Dane & Pratt,
2007), it might be a good candidate for a  QP based approach. In this
section, we consider a specific question in relation to intuition: does
the  transition from uncertainty about which response is  appropri-
ate, to the certainty associated with making the response, impact
on the underlying representations?
A common assumption for many formal models used in decision
theory, especially those based on CP theory, is  that the cogni-
tive system changes from moment to moment, but at any specific
moment is considered to be in a  definite state with respect to a
decision to be made. Using QP theory the situation is different. QP
allows the cognitive system to be  in an indefinite or superposition
state at each moment before the decision is made. This means that
the cognitive system has the potential for any of the possible deci-
sions at each moment in  time, but which one is selected cannot
be determined until the system is measured (e.g., the individual
provides a response). This leads to a second important difference
between CP and QP theory. According to  models based on baseline
CP theory, the measurement taken of a system at a  given moment
reflects the state of the system immediately prior to the measure-
ment. However, in QP theory, taking a measurement of a  system
creates rather than records a  property of the system (Peres, 1998),
which means that the subsequent state of the cognitive system is
constructed from the interaction between the superposition state
and the measurement taken (Bohr, 1958).
White, Pothos, & Busemeyer (2013) and White, Pothos, and
Busemeyer (2014) have provided an empirical demonstration of
the influence that measurement can have on the cognitive system,
using a  simple two-step affective ratings task. In the first step, a
positive (or negative) image was shown and in the second step
an image made up of a  combination of the first positive (nega-
tive) image and a  negative (positive) image was shown. In a  within
subjects, counter balanced design participants rated the same sec-
ond mixed images twice; after rating the first (single) image and
after only viewing the first image without rating it. This enabled a
within subjects comparison of ratings of the second mixed image,
when participants had seen identical first images, presented in  an
identical order, with the only difference being the presence of an
intermediate rating for the first image or not. Does this interme-
diate rating affect the second one? Baseline prescription from CP
theory tells us  that it should not (see also Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992,
for the same prediction, on the basis of an alternative, standard
framework). However, White et al. (2013, 2014) reported that the
intermediate rating led to  more negative ratings for the second
image in  the positive, negative order and vice versa (i.e., when the
images were presented in a  negative, positive order, an intermedi-
ate rating led  to more positive ratings for the second image).
Psychologically, such results are  not surprising. Several
researchers have argued that making a  choice can have a  con-
structive influence, in  relation to the underlying preference states.
Simply put, the act of choosing an option can sometimes increase
preference for that option (e.g., Ariely & Norton, 2008; Sharot et al.,
2010; cf. Festinger, 1957). The intuition is that, in some cases, inter-
nal values do  not exist. For example, the process of articulating a
preference elaborates the relevant internal states so that, after the
preference, these internal states are  no longer the same.
Of course, many classical systems exist, such that making a
choice can alter the relevant internal states. If we restrict ourselves
to  CP models, then a baseline assumption is that  all uncertainty
is epistemic, but internal values exist (it  is just that we  do not
know what these values are). Therefore, the process of making
a (non-invasive) measurement on the relevant states is  simply
one of reading off the internally existing values. One can certainly
endow CP approaches with mechanisms which allow judgments to
be  constructive, but  such mechanisms are additional components.
By contrast, according to a  QP approach, when the mental state is
a superposition state, then a  specific value for the corresponding
choice or  question does not  exist. It  is only through an act of mea-
surement (e.g., an expression of a  preference or decision), that a
value comes to be.
Obviously not all judgments involve a constructive process, as
for many cases there is  a previously learnt response, which is simply
retrieved at the point of measurement. However, for those types of
loosely structured, ambiguous situations, which afford more com-
plex, creative judgments, and which are more likely to feature
intuition (e.g., Klein, 1998; Shapiro & Spence, 1997), QP may  be
a more natural method for understanding the cognitive processes
involved in the transition from ambiguity to certainty. Prior to  the
decision, in  QP terms, the individual is in an uncertain or super-
position state, with respect to the decision being made. QP theory
can provide a  theory for the processes and related representations,
as this (superposition) uncertainty is resolved and, more specifi-
cally, provide concrete predictions regarding the way constructive
influences can arise.
7. Concluding comments
Research on decision making in organizations has generated
many different theories and approaches based on heuristics (e.g.,
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Gigerenzer, 1991; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), biases (e.g., Kahneman
et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), and socio-political influ-
ences (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Weick,
1995). There is general agreement that these approaches provide
an accurate, ecologically valid, description of decision making in
organizational and other real-life settings. Nevertheless, many still
argue that models based on rational analysis and CP theory offer
the best prescription for how decisions should be  made. As a result,
descriptive accounts of decision making based on, for example,
heuristics, when compared against recommendations based on CP
theory, can appear irrational or inaccurate. In other words, conjunc-
tions between less and more probable events, uncertainty, or other
interference effects in organizational decision making can lead to
results which are hard to reconcile with the ‘correct’ predictions
from CP theory.
Compared with rational analysis and models that use CP theory,
QP models have been more frequently shown to  be consistent with
descriptive models and theories of organizational decision making.
As it is possible to build normative arguments for QP theory, simi-
lar to those for CP theory (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2014), we suggest
that, in some cases, QP theory can be  used to justify decisions that
would otherwise be considered fallacious and re-cast them as being
formally correct (in QP terms).
We stated earlier in  this paper that our  work so far has been
focused on evaluating the validity of QP cognitive models, against
well-known empirical results. Indeed, much of the work in  QP
theory has focused on theory development and less attention has
been given to empirical demonstrations. Equally, where empirical
evidence has been gathered, it has focused on laboratory experi-
ments; very little applied work has been carried out (for a  notable
exception see Wang, Solloway, Shiffrin, & Busemeyer, 2014). The
objective of this paper is  to explore whether the theoretical or
research-oriented success of QP models can translate to implica-
tions for real-life organizational decision making. What have we
learned about real life decision making from the QP cognition pro-
gram? Our approach has been to provide a summary of our current
work with QP cognitive models and so motivate a  range of intuitive
applications in organizational decision making. In other words, we
have sought to generalize the lab-based, experimental situations,
against which current QP models have been developed, to anal-
ogous real-life situations. We  think that the generalizations we
make are reasonable, nevertheless, at this point, inevitably they
involve a fair amount of speculation too. Without direct experi-
mental testing, it would be  impossible to settle the case one way
or another.
How might we go about testing some of our ideas in an applied
setting? As reviewed in  this paper, QP models can be  tested using
methodologies common to  most judgment and decision making
research. However, QP models also incorporate process assump-
tions. Thus, experiments that involve sequencing of information
and varying requirements on timing of decisions could lead to
strong tests of QP models. For example, the in-tray exercise, a man-
agement simulation used in assessment and management training,
involves presenting participants with emails and memos  concern-
ing organizational issues and asking them to make decisions about
those issues. Stimuli can be  about different types of issues (e.g.,
strategic, operational, personnel). Stimuli are delivered either all
together, where the ability to plan and prioritize is part of the
assessment or sequentially, over the course of the exercise, so
that adaptability can be assessed. So, for example, the exercise
could enable tests of how a  prior decision might influence a  sub-
sequent decision, as well as how the act of making a decision itself
might influence later judgment. Another potential area for test-
ing some of the process assumptions in  QP models is  the decision
making of selectors working on an assessment center who, as a
requirement of the assessment center procedures, will experience
different sequences in the evaluation of candidates. Business sim-
ulations, a tool used in management development or  case studies,
a  mainstay of business school education, may  be useful ways of
testing our ideas regarding the conjunction fallacy and law of total
probability. For example, a  business opportunity with a  variety of
characteristics might be evaluated, with a view to include charac-
teristics which might lead to a  conjunction fallacy or  ensure the
absence of certain information, so as to  produce a violation in the
law of total probability. Such experimental tests present us with an
exciting direction for future research.
A source of optimism regarding this more applied direction of
the QP research program is  that the application of QP theory does
not  assume representational resources, which, in  an applied set-
ting, can be considered unrealistic. In CP  theory, it is generally
possible to construct a  complete joint probability distribution, for
arbitrary sets of possibilities (Griffiths, 2003, calls this the principle
of unicity). But  how realistic is  this requirement? For  example, in
the case of Linda, classically, we  need a complete joint probability
distribution, not just for the properties of being a  bank teller and a
feminist, but for any arbitrary combination of properties, including
ones which are rarely encountered together. It  is  unclear where the
information for these joint probability distributions would come
from. Moreover, there is  an issue of computational complexity,
since, for N binary possibilities, specification of the complete joint
would require 2N probabilities (and many more for the correspond-
ing  marginals). Such complexity may  be beyond the capacity of
the human mind (cf. Simon, 1955). Quantum theory avoids such
problems and so perhaps provides a  more natural framework for
modeling human decision making, especially in  applied settings.
We hope that such a priori arguments, together with the directions
we outlined in this paper, will help make the case that the develop-
ment of QP cognitive models is a promising endeavor for modeling
decision making in applied contexts of fairly direct practical signif-
icance.
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